By G. R. G Mure
An summary exposition of Hegel's different types is gifted with the goal of being of help on a primary interpreting of Hegel.
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Additional resources for A study of Hegel's logic
461, reprint: p. 49’. In other words, I have assumed that the first page reference is to “Über das sogenannte Erkenntnisproblem,” which appeared in Abhandlungen der 30 Katarzyna Paprzycka Fries’schen Schule: Neue Folge 2, while the second page reference is either to a reprint of that work or to its independent page numbering. 4. I have marked my insertions into the text by square brackets. Occasionally I have inserted longer comments, in which case they are placed in footnotes at the bottom of the page using symbols ‘*’, ‘†’ to mark them apart from Wiegner’s footnotes.
I claim that a scientific solution of this problem is impossible. Let us assume that there exists a criterion which could solve the problem. This criterion itself would need to be classified as either knowledge or not. If the criterion in question is a part of knowledge, then it belongs precisely to the problematic domain whose validity should be first determined by the theory of knowledge. The criterion that will solve the problem cannot therefore be a part of knowledge. Consider the case when the criterion is not a part of knowledge.
E. as a product. But Nelson is not familiar with the distinction between an act and a product. For him, every mental phenomenon is an act, so “Erkenntnis” is a synonym of “Erkennen,” “Anschauung” of “Anschauen,” etc. I must add that the term “Anschauung” is similarly ambiguous. In general, Nelson’s whole psychological terminology leaves much to be desired. Even the term “Assoziation” is ambiguous. On p. 745 (reprint: p. 333), we read “Die Reflexion darf aber hier nicht als ein selbständiges und von der Assoziation unabhängiges Erkenntnisvermögen betrachtet werden,” where even association has become a capacity.